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In Oregon, a sexual offender is convicted of rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree,
and sexual abuse in the first degree - his victim, a child under the age of twelve. n1 A father is
convicted of raping and sodomizing his ten-year-old daughter. n2 Another offender is convicted of
four counts of sodomy in the first degree, three counts of rape in the first degree, four counts of
sexual abuse in the second degree, unlawful sexual penetration in the first degree, and two counts of
unlawful sexual penetration in the second degree. n3 A defendant, charged with the rape, sodomy,
and sexual abuse of a five-year-old, awaits a new trial; n4 he was previously convicted for the
attempted sexual abuse of an eleven-year-old whom he babysat. n5
Sex crimes occur with shocking frequency in the United States. The alarming number of sex
crime convictions and the seriousness  [*268]  of victim impacts have prompted government
officials to find innovative methods to combat sex crimes. One alternative approach features
compulsory chemical castration of convicted sex offenders. Although castration may seem like a
step away from modern notions of retribution and rehabilitation, medical advances have turned the
use of chemical castration into the new rage for fighting sex crimes. ORS 144.625, n6 passed by the
Oregon legislature in the summer of 1999, is one example of castration legislation arising
throughout the United States. This statute mandates the Department of Corrections to establish a
supervised pilot treatment program for certain convicted sex offenders. n7 Treatment is mandatory
for those individuals selected to participate in the program, which involves the injection of sex-
drive-reducing hormones. n8
This Comment provides a comprehensive evaluation of the use of chemical castration to treat
sex offenders. Part I explores the sex crime epidemic in the United States and the historical and
contemporary uses of castration both internationally and in the United States. Part II evaluates
current Oregon laws affecting convicted sex offenders, with a specific focus on ORS 144.625,
Oregon's chemical castration pilot program. This part also discusses the antiandrogen drug,
medroxyprogesterone acetate, and its side effects. Part III analyzes the constitutionality of the new
Oregon castration law, focusing on issues of cruel and unusual punishment, double jeopardy, and ex
post facto laws. Part IV examines a civil liberties approach to chemical castration and its possible
use as an alternative to incarceration.
I
 Sexual Assault and the History of Surgical and Chemical Castration
A. The Sex Crime Epidemic
 In the United States, incidences of sexual assault and rape occur with outrageous regularity.
According to a study by the U.S. Department of Justice, a woman is raped every two minutes in the
United States. n9 In 1996 alone, 307,000 women were victims  [*269]  of rape, attempted rape, or
sexual assault. n10 Within a two-year period, more than 670,000 women were victims of rape,
attempted rape, or sexual assault. n11 Child molestation also occurs frequently in the United States,
with conservative estimates suggesting sexual abuse of 100,000 to 500,000 children each year,
costing the United States $ 2,055,528,000 to incarcerate those offenders in 1990 alone. n12 Sex
abuse does not discriminate between the sexes: one study found that approximately one of every six
boys is sexually abused before the age of sixteen. n13 In an adult retrospective study, 27% of the
women and 16% of the men reported sexual victimization, with a median age for reported abuse of
9.9 for boys and 9.6 for girls. n14 Although statistical estimates n15 show that only a portion of
victims report sexual assault to law enforcement officials, n16 sex crime convictions are frequent
and numerous. In Oregon alone, sex offenders comprise 29% of all incarcerated inmates in the
prison system. n17
Child sexual abuse may lead to long-term traumatic effects, which may subsequently develop
into an area of adult conflict. These long-term effects include "fear, anxiety, depression, anger,
hostility, inappropriate sexual behavior, poor self esteem, tendency  [*270]  toward substance abuse
and difficulty with close relationships." n18 As adults, these victims have been found to have
interpersonal relationship problems associated with an underlying mistrust, along with "sexual
guilt," or "guilt derived from sexual pleasure." n19
The effects of child sexual abuse may also increase the propensity for criminal behavior. An
estimated 31% of women in prison reported being abused as children, along with approximately
95% of teenage prostitutes. n20 Studies with males found that "one-third of juvenile delinquents,
40% of sexual offenders and 76% of serial rapists report they were sexually abused as youngsters."
n21
The frequency and dangerous nature of sexual abuse forces society to treat it as a major social
problem. As such, from perpetration of the offense to post-prison supervision of the offender, use of
the criminal justice system is required to help protect victims of sexual abuse, to prevent future
criminal acts, and to remedy the frequent occurrence of sex crimes.
B. Use of Castration Internationally
 Castration is currently used as a form of rehabilitation in western countries such as Denmark,
Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, with some of these countries physically castrating
convicted rapists. n22 The German castration law, however, legalizes only voluntary chemical
castration. n23 In effect since 1969, this law provides that an independent commission of experts,
after reviewing medical evidence supporting offenders' requests to participate in the procedure,
must determine which offenders will undergo treatment. The use of chemical castration in Europe
has proven to be very successful, with studies showing a drop in recidivism from 65% to 15% after
antiandrogen treatment. n24 A study in Denmark found that only 2.2% of 900 sex offenders
relapsed into former deviant behavior after undergoing  [*271]  the chemical procedure. n25
Although most American courts have rejected the use of surgical castration on grounds such as
cruel and unusual punishment, n26 recent medical advances have helped bolster the trend towards
acceptance of chemical castration in the legal system. n27
C. Castration in the United States
 Castration has been used throughout history to punish sex offenders. In 1776, Thomas Jefferson
promoted surgical castration for offenders convicted of sodomy, rape, or polygamy. n28 The
sentence of castration given to those convicted of sex crimes continued into the early twentieth
century. The eugenics movement of the early twentieth century endorsed both castration and
sterilization to punish and to "achieve the elimination of social ills through biological reformation."
n29 Certain states even had laws that required castration as a punishment for a variety of
infractions, although they focused mainly on recidivists. n30 By the end of World War II, however,
the use of castration as a means to regulate criminal behavior fell into disfavor. n31
 [*272]
II
 ORS 144.625: Oregon's Chemical Castration Pilot Program
A. Current Oregon Laws Affecting Convicted Sex Offenders
 Under Oregon law, a sex offender is defined as a person who:
 (1) has been convicted of a sex crime;
(2) has been found guilty except for insanity of a sex crime;
(3) has been found to be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for having committed an act
that if committed by an adult would constitute a sex crime; or
(4) is paroled in Oregon under ORS 144.610 after being convicted in another jurisdiction of a
crime that would constitute a sex crime if committed in Oregon. n32
 The Oregon Revised Statutes provide a long list for determining what constitutes a "sex crime,"
including offenses such as rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse. n33 For purposes of the chemical
[*273]  castration pilot program, acts of public indecency also constitute "sex crimes."
 A person commits the crime of public indecency if while in, or in view of, a public place the person
performs:
(a) An act of sexual intercourse;
(b) An act of deviate sexual intercourse; or
(c) An act of exposing the genitals of the person with the intent of arousing the sexual desire of
the person or another person. n34
 Currently, numerous Oregon laws govern convicted sex offenders. These laws provide for the strict
punishment of sex offenses, and/or were put in effect for purposes of rehabilitation and public
safety. They range from imposing mandatory minimum sentences for dangerous sex offenders n35
to requiring supervision of persons found to be sexually dangerous. n36 Additionally, anyone
convicted of a sex offense in Oregon, or anyone convicted in another jurisdiction of a crime that
would constitute a sex crime if committed in Oregon, must complete a sex offender registration
form within ten days of discharge from the correctional institution. n37 The offender must also
report in person to the Department of State Police, a chief of police or a county sheriff, or to the
supervising agency. n38 This must be done once each year and whenever he or she changes
residence. n39 If a sex offender is determined to be predatory, the supervising agency may notify
anyone whom the agency determines is appropriate concerning the offender's legal status, regardless
of the nature of the crime for which the offender is being supervised. n40 Furthermore, state
agencies use Internet websites to post general information about sex offenders. These sites may
contain the offender's photograph, legal status, and current address. n41 Oregon  [*274]  also has
experimented with innovative therapies for sex offenders, including a program that subjected
convicted rapists to electric shock in an attempt to "'create a phobic response to rape.'" n42 Given
the current laws affecting sex offenders, it is not surprising that Oregon recently joined several other
states n43 in subjecting convicted sex offenders to chemical castration as a condition of parole or
post-prison supervision.
ORS 144.625, which was approved on July 1, 1999 by Governor John A. Kitzhaber, directs the
Department of Corrections to establish a supervised pilot treatment program for forty to fifty
convicted sex offenders who are eligible for release within six months on parole or post-prison
supervision. n44 The purpose of the program "is to reduce the risk of reoffending after release on
parole or post-prison supervision" by providing antiandrogen treatment to those selected sex
offenders. n45 This is consistent with the Department's policy to promote public safety by "holding
offenders accountable for their actions, and by seeking ways to reduce their risk of committing
future criminal acts." n46 The Department provides convicted sex offenders with hormones or
antiandrogens, such as medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA), although persons undergoing the
treatment must pay all costs of the program. n47 Chemical castration is mandatory for those eligible
sex offenders whose "suitability" for hormone or antiandrogen treatment upon release has been
determined. n48 The Department must decide which convicted sex offenders would  [*275]  most
likely benefit from the treatment and refer them to a competent physician for medical evaluation.
n49 Those identified as medically contraindicated after an evaluation by a physician are excluded
from the treatment program. n50 However, nothing prohibits the State Board of Parole and Post-
Prison Supervision from requiring hormone or antiandrogen treatment for a person whom the
Department of Corrections did not screen or evaluate. n51 The supervising county community
corrections agency monitors the offender's compliance with chemical treatment by implementing
the following procedures: the community practitioner must (1) promptly notify the offender's
assigned parole officer of any failure by the offender to comply with the program; (2) administer
treatment and maintain control of the medication between doses; and (3) test the offender's blood at
least once every three months to determine if the offender is complying with the treatment program.
n52 The community practitioner is also charged with increasing the frequency of testing when
relapse warning signs occur. n53 Failure to cooperate in the treatment program, or use of any
steroid or other chemical to counteract the treatment, constitutes a violation of a condition of parole
or post-prison supervision, and the sex offender becomes subject to sanctions. n54
On its face, ORS 144.625 applies to "persons convicted of sex crimes," which arguably includes
female sex offenders. However, MPA does not affect females in the same way males are affected by
the drug: it acts as a birth control device for females and does not suppress their "erotic desires."
Consequently, it appears ORS 144.625 is targeted specifically at male sex offenders, because
providing such "treatment" for female offenders does not comport with the program's goal to reduce
the risk of reoffending. n55
 [*276]  The Department of Corrections views sex offender treatment selection as a medical,
rather than a legal, judgment. n56 Suitability for participation in the Department's pilot program is
determined by the following criteria: the inmate (1) has a current or past conviction for a sex crime,
(2) is within six months of release on parole or post-prison supervision, and (3) the inmate's present
incarceration is for a second conviction of a sex crime (recidivistic sex offender), the inmate lacks
intellectual capacity for impulse control (mentally retarded or disabled sex offenders) or has
demonstrated an excessive sex drive (hyper-sexualism). n57 Recidivistic sex offenders are
determined suitable when twice convicted of offenses such as first-degree sexual abuse. n58
Because recidivism best evidences long-term risks of reoffense, these individuals are considered
prime candidates for the treatment program. n59 Mentally retarded or disabled sex offenders are
also considered prime candidates because these individuals have difficulty controlling their sex
drives. n60 Finally, those persons demonstrating hyper-sexualism, which may include frequent
masturbation, are targeted as prime candidates. n61 These individuals are referred either by the
department's counselors or by state parole and probation officers. n62
B. The Drug: Medroxyprogesterone Acetate (Antiandrogens)
 Medroxyprogesterone acetate, better known as the female contraceptive Depo-Provera, n63 is
specifically mentioned by the Oregon legislature as the form of antiandrogen or hormone  [*277]
treatment to be provided for those selected for the procedure. Antiandrogen therapy (estrogen) was
first used in 1949 to reduce the sexual drive in a transvestite pedophile. n64 Since then, a raging
controversy has arisen concerning the ethical use of MPA on sex offenders as a form of therapy.
n65 Similar to the administration of Depo-Provera as a female contraceptive, MPA is given in the
form of injections and can therefore be easily administered by the Department of Corrections. n66
MPA is proven to substantially lower serum testosterone by "accelerating the metabolism of
testosterone and by inhibiting release of luteinizing hormone from the pituitary gland." n67 This
suppresses testosterone production in the testes and facilitates its elimination from circulation. In
one report, testosterone levels dropped to as low as one-fourth of the patients' pretreatment levels.
n68 Because MPA reduces the level of testosterone circulating through the bloodstream, it may help
sex offenders by "lowering the intensity of inappropriate sexual cravings and the frequency of
unacceptable erotic preoccupations." n69 When used on males, "MPA effectively suppresses
erections, ejaculations, and reduces the frequency and intensity of erotic thoughts." n70 However,
MPA is not a "cure" because it does not change the nature of the offender's sexual desire and
inclination towards certain individuals, such as children. Because the prescription of MPA for
paraphilic and other types of sex offenders remains a non-indicated use (not approved by the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration), some argue that it is more difficult to medically justify the
prescription of these drugs for paraphilia-related and other sexually related disorders. n71 MPA's
effectiveness, however,  [*278]  is evidenced in a study conducted on twenty men at the Johns
Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore. n72 In this study, eleven of twenty men treated with MPA
discontinued the use of the drug during the course of their treatment. n73 Within a year of
discontinuing treatment, the recidivism rate rose dramatically: ten of the eleven individuals who
ceased taking MPA relapsed by showing recurrences of sexually deviant behavior. In comparison,
before those individuals discontinued therapy, only three of the twenty patients relapsed. n74
MPA is most effective with sex offenders who acknowledge the intolerable and uncontrolled
nature of their sex drive. Some experts have classified sex offenders into four categories: (1)
offenders who are known as "paraphiliacs" or individuals who use unacceptable stimuli such as
children for sexual arousal, fantasy, and fulfillment; (2) offenders who generally confess to
committing the crime, but transfer blame for the crime to "nonsexual or nonpersonal forces, such as
alcohol, drugs, or stress"; (3) offenders who are violent criminals motivated by anger and hostility,
rather than by sexual desire; and (4) offenders who normally deny the criminal nature of their
actions or deny that they have perpetrated a crime. n75 MPA has proven effective for only
paraphiliacs. n76 Many researchers note that the drug is not likely to have any meaningful influence
on the three other types of sex offenders that may come within the reach of the program. n77
Studies indicate that the treatment is limited in use, proving ineffective for offenders motivated by
anger and hostility. n78 Because distinct forces motivate each of the four types of sex offenders,
[*279]  legislative measures designed to reduce recidivism rates should specify treatment for
offenders that would most benefit from MPA. Experts argue that "the pivotal criterion in calculating
the treatability of a sex offender is his acknowledgment that his conduct is intolerable and beyond
his control." n79 Thus, primarily those patients who acknowledge that their conduct is
uncontrollable will respond favorably to MPA treatment.
Authorities also criticize the mandatory administration of MPA to sex offenders absent evidence
that forced treatment is likely to be more effective than voluntary treatment. n80 Studies show that
offenders who are involuntarily committed to a treatment facility are less likely to respond to the
alternative treatment. n81 "The offender must cooperate with treatment in order to have any chance
for containing the deviant sexuality." n82 Thus, the notion of voluntariness is acknowledged as
being critical to treatment success. Dr. Fred S. Berlin, founder of the Sexual Disorders Clinic at
Johns Hopkins University, also disagrees with involuntary use of antiandrogen treatment and
cautions that a law mandating the procedure could actually make sex offenders more dangerous.
n83 He reasons that if the sexual predator becomes "angry and bitter" over the treatment, the
situation could become "potentially volatile." n84
Finally, physicians face the dilemma of whether professional ethics permit cooperation in
oversight and administration of the mandated chemical treatments. Although the American Medical
Association's Principles of Medical Ethics recognizes that practitioners have civic duties, a
physician is not required to carry out duties that contradict fundamental medical ethical principles.
As practitioners are required to avoid doing harm, they may have an ethical obligation to refuse to
participate in legal procedures that are based not on sound medical diagnoses, but rather on
legislatively defined behaviors. This dilemma is particularly poignant given that the Board of Parole
and Post-Prison Supervision has  [*280]  the authority to require antiandrogen treatment without
first obtaining an evaluation from, or having the offender screened by, a Department of Corrections
practitioner. This eliminates the assurance an independent medical diagnosis provides by
determining the offender's suitability for treatment. Without this determination, the community
practitioner providing chemical treatment risks harming the offender if he is not the type of offender
MPA treatment is designed to benefit, or if he would have been medically contraindicated after an
evaluation by a competent physician.
C. MPA Side Effects
 Although MPA diminishes sex drive and induces a feeling of sexual calm (reversible upon
discontinuation), n85 its side effects are considerable. ORS 144.625 mandates that the Department
of Corrections inform all sex offenders undergoing the procedure not only of the program's effects,
but also of the drug's side effects. n86 Common problems include "weight gain, fatigue at the time
of injection, hot and cold flashes, headaches, and insomnia." n87 Other reported side effects,
although uncommon, include thrombophlebitis, n88 pulmonary thromboembolism, n89 lowered
ejaculatory volume, nausea, skin sensitivity reactions, high fever, increased appetite, mental
depression, loss of body hair, hyperglycemia, abnormal sperm, nightmares, dyspnea, n90 leg
cramps, irregular gall bladder function and gallstones, hypertension, diverticulitis, n91 diabetic
sequelae, hypogonadism, n92 malaise, n93 gastrointestinal complaints, and shrinkage of the prostate
and  [*281]  seminal vessels. n94 MPA administration may also result in complete impotence and
decreased erotic desire. n95
Although studies differ regarding whether men become feminized in appearance, at least one
report recognizes the "rare feminizing effects [of MPA] such as breast enlargement and changes in
hair distribution during prolonged treatment." n96 In at least one study, forty of forty-eight subjects
taking MPA reported improvement - meaning diminished sexual drive and decreased frequency of
sexual fantasies. n97 Also noted in the report was an increase in verbal communication, and patients
showing more concern about their families. n98
III
 Constitutional Considerations
 ORS 144.625 raises multiple constitutional concerns, including violations of both federal and state
constitutions prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, double jeopardy, and ex post facto laws.
A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
 Both the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Oregon Constitution protect
individuals against cruel and unusual punishment. n99 Accordingly, Oregon's chemical castration
law is unconstitutional if the procedure inflicts cruel and unusual punishment on the individual
subjected to the procedure. To pass constitutional muster, therefore, ORS 144.625 must survive a
two-part inquiry: (1) does chemical castration constitute punishment, and (2) if so, does it amount to
cruel and unusual punishment?
1. Punishment or Rehabilitative Treatment?
 At most, Oregon's chemical castration program may fall somewhere between treatment and
punishment. The best way to prevent  [*282]  sex offense recidivism, studies suggest, is chemical
treatment combined with behavioral therapy or psychotherapy. n100 In one study, psychological
therapy alone was proven effective in reducing recidivism rates by up to eleven percent. n101 When
coupled with MPA treatment, however, recidivism rates were further reduced by up to seventy-two
percent. n102
The stated purpose behind ORS 144.625 is "to reduce the risk of reoffending after release on
parole or post-prison supervision." n103 ORS 144.625 does not provide for psychological therapy
as part of the castration procedure. Given that medical evidence suggests psychological therapy
must be combined with the use of MPA for maximum therapeutic potential, n104 the state's
ultimate goal is arguably not the treatment of the offenders.
Regardless of whether Oregon's chemical castration program is labeled "treatment for" versus
"punishment of" the offenders, ORS 144.625 may still be subject to judicial scrutiny. n105 The
legislative classification of a statute is not conclusive in determining a violation of the Eighth
Amendment. n106 Despite benign legislative classifications, courts may look to the purpose and
effect of the drug to determine if it passes Eighth Amendment scrutiny. n107  [*283]  Thus,
regardless of the program's legislative classification, it is necessary to determine whether the
purpose and effect of the drug is cruel and unusual.
2. Cruel and Unusual?
 Throughout history, varying punishments were deemed cruel and unusual, including surgical
castration, n108 vasectomies, n109 and certain forms of the death penalty. n110 The Supreme Court
has recognized that the meaning of "cruel and unusual" must draw from "the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." n111 In Oregon, for a punishment to be
declared "cruel and unusual" without reference to its duration, the punishment must be so
disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is right
and proper in the circumstances. n112 Under both constitutions, therefore, whether chemical
castration is deemed cruel and unusual depends on modern society's values, morals, and notions of
decency.
In Furman v. Georgia, n113 the Supreme Court of the United States set forth a four-pronged
framework that is commonly used to determine whether a given punishment is cruel and unusual. In
his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan stated:
 The test, then, will ordinarily be a cumulative one: If a punishment is unusually severe, if there is a
strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected by contemporary
society, and if there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than
some less severe punishment, then the continued infliction of that punishment violates the command
of the Clause that the State may not inflict inhuman and uncivilized punishments upon those
convicted of crimes. n114
 Under this framework, courts must consider under the totality of the circumstances whether the
punishment is: "(1) inherently  [*284]  cruel or severe; (2) excessive, disproportionate, or
unnecessary; (3) unacceptable to society; or (4) inflicted arbitrarily." n115
In applying the above criteria to ORS 144.625, MPA treatment is arguably not inherently cruel
or severe, because it will most commonly only cause minor side effects, most of which are
reversible upon discontinuation of the medication. Another safeguard offers exclusion from the
program if the offender is determined medically contraindicated after evaluation by a physician.
MPA also actually helps certain sex offenders by lowering testosterone levels, thereby reducing
sexual imagery and controlling previously unmanageable urges. Moreover, unlike surgical
castration or vasectomy, MPA treatment does not mutilate the parolee and can have a rehabilitative
effect during treatment. Finally, the injections themselves cause minimal discomfort and cannot be
considered severe.
However, many courts have determined that even punishment or probation conditions involving
little or no pain can be inherently cruel or excessive. n116 Humiliation, degradation, and other
severe mental pain may be determined to be as cruel as infliction of physical pain and mutilation.
n117 The court in Davis v. Berry n118 struck down on Eighth Amendment grounds an Iowa statute,
which provided for the vasectomies n119 of repeat felons. Although the court distinguished surgical
castration from vasectomy, it also noted that both induced similar effects on the defendant. The
court held that vasectomy constituted cruel and unusual punishment because "the humiliation, the
degradation, [and] the mental suffering are always present and known." n120
MPA treatment may also be considered inherently cruel or excessive when practiced on sex
offenders whose health may be severely affected by the drug. The use of MPA and its uncommon
but dangerous side effects may pose serious health risks to certain individuals. As noted earlier, side
effects can include pulmonary  [*285]  thromboembolism (blockage of the pulmonary artery by
foreign matter or by a blood clot), high fever, difficulty in breathing, elevated blood pressure, and
irregular gall bladder function. n121 The drug may cause physical discomfort to the parolee, with
side effects ranging from nausea to gallstones to painful inflammation in the intestinal tract. n122
What seems particularly cruel and excessive is that these side effects may be inflicted upon the sex
offender without the individual benefitting from MPA's therapeutic effect. If anger or power
motivated the offender to commit the sex crime, MPA will not help in rehabilitation because it has
no effect on the focus of the offender's motivation to commit the crime.
However, because ORS 144.625 directs the Department of Corrections to refer those offenders
who would most benefit from the treatment, this may not be an obstacle. Those deemed by the
Department as most appropriate for the treatment include recidivistic offenders, mentally retarded
or disabled offenders, and offenders displaying hyper-sexualism. If the Department selects
offenders proven to respond well medically and psychologically to MPA treatment, use of the drug
may not be considered inherently cruel, excessive, or unnecessary.
Use of MPA to castrate certain sex offenders does not appear to be unacceptable to society as a
whole. Justice Marshall stated that whether punishment is cruel and unusual depends "on whether
people who were fully informed as to the purposes of the penalty and its liabilities would find the
penalty shocking, unjust, and unacceptable." n123 Given the complex nature of MPA and its effects
on various sex offenders, most people are arguably not fully informed as to the purposes of MPA
treatment or its side effects. Although medical and legal experts are split on the effectiveness of the
treatment, n124 chemical castration does not appear to be unacceptable to society as a whole.
In fact, the use of chemical castration is often supported as "a fair condition of parole for repeat
child molesters." n125 Because molesting or raping a child is also a serious violation of human
[*286]  rights, what may be termed the "eye for an eye" position rejects the argument that chemical
castration violates human rights. n126 The argument is that "the rights of children [should not] be
less important than those of convicted sex offenders." n127 Some commentators take a retributivist
approach, noting that testosterone-lowering treatment and its side effects "can hardly be described
as cruel and unusual" when compared to the crimes for which the sex offenders were convicted.
n128
Additionally, the castration alternative should not be considered disproportionate punishment
for a sexual abuse conviction given the seriousness of the crime and the impact and suffering of the
victims. n129 In Solem v. Helm, n130 the Supreme Court expressly determined that the Eighth
Amendment guarantees proportionality in non-capital sentencing. However, in Harmelin v.
Michigan, n131 the Court held that a state may impose life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole for possession of 650 grams of cocaine. Although the Harmelin Court did not overrule
Solem, the Eighth Amendment's guarantee of proportionality in non-capital sentencing was left
"eviscerated." n132
By contrast, a sentence violates the Oregon Constitution if it "is so disproportionate to the
offense as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable persons as to what is right and proper." n133 In
spite of this, Oregon courts have repeatedly affirmed lengthy prison sentences and parole
conditions, including a twelve-year prison sentence for forging a check, n134 a seventy-month
mandatory minimum prison sentence for second-degree robbery, n135 and a seventy-five-month
sentence for a fifteen-year-  [*287]  old's first sexual abuse offense. n136 Although chemical
castration may not be considered disproportionate for a sexual abuse or rape conviction, it is
possible that a sentence including parole conditions mandating chemical treatment may be held
disproportionate to certain sex offenses. For example, acts of public indecency fall within the reach
of the chemical castration program. An offender commits the crime of public indecency when he,
while in, or in view of, a public place, performs an act of sexual intercourse or deviate sexual
intercourse, or exposes his genitals with the intent of arousing the sexual desire of another person.
n137 Public indecency is a Class A misdemeanor for first time offenders, or a Class C felony if the
person has a prior conviction for public indecency or a crime described in ORS 163.355 to 163.445.
n138 The term of imprisonment for a Class A misdemeanor is limited to one year, in comparison to
a five-year limitation for a Class C felony. n139 A sex offender convicted twice of public indecency
may fall within the reach of antiandrogen treatment. At some point during incarceration, the
offender will be within six months of release on parole or post-prison supervision and will have two
current crime convictions. If conviction of a public indecency offense is viewed as an offender's
demonstration  [*288]  of an excessive sex drive or hyper-sexualism, the offender is considered
suitable for treatment. Additionally, the second crime of public indecency not only turns the offense
into a Class C felony, but the inmate's incarceration for the second conviction labels the inmate a
recidivistic sex offender. This also puts the offender within reach of the program. Because a repeat
public indecency offense is punishable by up to five years imprisonment, mandatory MPA
treatment may similarly require up to five years of implementation as a part of parole or post-prison
supervision. Applying the Oregon proportionality test to public indecency offenses, mandated
chemical castration of these offenders may likely shock the moral sense of reasonable persons as to
what is right and proper because chemical treatment may be viewed as unnecessary or excessive
punishment.
Another concern involves the possible duration of chemical treatment for offenders on parole or
post-prison supervision. ORS 144.103 provides that any person sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for violating or attempting to violate statutes prohibiting rape in the first or second
degree, sodomy in the first or second degree, unlawful sexual penetration in the first or second
degree, or sexual abuse in the first or second degree, "shall serve a term of post-prison supervision
that shall continue until the term of the post-prison supervision, when added to the term of
imprisonment served, equals the maximum statutory indeterminate sentence for the violation." n140
In addition to any sentence of imprisonment required by law, ORS 137.765 mandates a period of
post-prison supervision that extends for the life of any offender determined to be a "sexually violent
dangerous offender." n141 To put this in context, an offender who is convicted  [*289]  of sexual
abuse in the first degree is guilty of a Class B felony, which provides a maximum sentence term of
ten years. n142 The offender must serve a term of post-prison supervision that shall continue until
the term of the post-prison supervision, when added to the term of imprisonment served, equals the
maximum statutory indeterminate sentence of ten years.
In comparison, post-prison supervision extends for the life of an offender determined to be a
"sexually violent dangerous predator." Although the offender convicted of first-degree sexual abuse
may be subject to chemical treatment up to ten years minus his imprisonment term served, "a
sexually violent dangerous predator" may be subject to lifelong MPA treatment. In such
circumstances, a proportionality challenge may arise based on the length of treatment and the lack
of medical data on the effects of lifelong MPA usage or data suggesting safe lifelong treatment.
 [*290]  Another approach is to view the program as allowing the offender to decide whether to
undergo chemical castration as an alternative to incarceration. Because MPA treatment is a
condition of parole or post-prison supervision, the inmate may decide to either undergo treatment as
a part of parole or post-prison supervision, or remain incarcerated while serving the remainder of
his sentence. The inmate's desire for freedom will likely weigh heavily in favor of giving consent to
undergo treatment. It does not seem irrational or involuntary to undergo treatment so as to avoid a
lengthy incarceration period, and therefore the offender's consent may be considered voluntary even
under coercive circumstances. When compared to imprisonment, castration may be considered a
more humane form of punishment. Weighed against lengthy prison sentences that may subject a
convicted offender to daily life-threatening violence and sexual abuse, castration appears to be a
reasonable alternative. Others argue, however, that states should eliminate the use of chemical
castration altogether. They suggest alternative measures of punishment that are clearly more cruel
and severe than castration, such as mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole for
first-time sex offenders. n143
In summary, under both the Federal and Oregon Constitutions, MPA usage is probably not cruel
and unusual if limited to the appropriate type of offender and if it is not considered disproportionate
punishment for the offense committed. Psychological therapy should also be combined with MPA
usage for maximum treatment potential.
B. Double Jeopardy
 Both the United States and Oregon Constitutions also protect an individual's right to be free from
double jeopardy. n144 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution provides
protection in three situations: "a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the  [*291]  same
offense." n145 Similar to the previous Eighth Amendment analysis, whether ORS 144.625 violates
the Double Jeopardy Clause first depends on whether the procedure constitutes punishment. n146
In Kansas v. Hendricks, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator
Act, which establishes procedures for the civil commitment of persons who, due to a "mental
abnormality" or "personality disorder," are likely to engage in "predatory acts of sexual violence."
n147 Hendricks, who had an extensive history of molesting children, challenged the Act on
constitutional grounds when the state found that pedophilia qualified as a mental abnormality under
the Act, and ordered him committed when he was scheduled for release from prison. n148 In
analyzing Hendricks' double jeopardy claim, the Court found that the Act did not violate the
Constitution's double jeopardy prohibition because the Act did not establish criminal proceedings,
and involuntary confinement under it was not punishment. n149 The court reasoned that
commitment under the Act did not implicate the two primary objectives of criminal punishment:
retribution or deterrence. The Court explained:
 The Act's purpose is not retributive because it does not affix culpability for prior criminal conduct.
Instead, such conduct is used solely for evidentiary purposes[; it] does not make a criminal
conviction a prerequisite for commitment[; and], unlike a criminal statute, no finding of scienter is
required... . Nor can it be said that the legislature intended the Act to function as a deterrent. Those
persons committed under the Act are, by definition, suffering from a "mental abnormality" or a
"personality disorder" that prevents them from exercising adequate control over their behavior.
Such persons are therefore unlikely to be deterred by the threat of confinement. And the conditions
surrounding that confinement [ - essentially the same as conditions for any civilly committed patient
- ] do not suggest a punitive purpose on the State's part. n150
 The Court's conclusion that the Act was nonpunitive removed the essential predicate for a double
jeopardy claim.
Similarly, ORS 144.625 may not implicate the objectives of retribution  [*292]  or deterrence.
The stated purpose behind ORS 144.625 is the nonpunitive treatment of the offender, and it is
difficult to find anything on the face of ORS 144.625 suggesting that the Oregon legislature sought
to create anything other than a treatment program. n151 Moreover, the threat of chemical castration
may not deter sex offenders, such as pedophiles, if their sexual inclinations result from a "mental
abnormality," "personality disorder," or other "uncontrollable" urge.
Assuming that the castration procedure is in fact punishment, failure to comply with the
program and its consequent sanctions do not appear to violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. ORS
144.625 provides that an offender's failure to comply with the program violates a condition of
parole or post-prison supervision. n152 This does not constitute a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal or a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. Likewise, the
mandated sanctions implemented upon failure by the offender to comply with the chemical
treatment program arguably do not amount to multiple punishments for the same offense, as the
sanctions would not be an added punishment for the sex crime conviction, but rather the
consequence of a parole or post-prison supervision violation. As such, it does not appear that ORS
144.625 implicates Fifth Amendment protections.
Finally, ORS 144.040 to ORS 144.109 and Oregon case law suggest that the Board of Parole
and Post-Prison Supervision has broad discretion in implementing and determining special
conditions as part of an offender's parole or post-prison supervision. In Rund v. Board of Parole &
Post-Prison Supervision, n153 a petitioner sought judicial review of orders of the Board of Parole
and Post-Prison Supervision, contending that the Board acted outside its authority when it required
him, as a condition of his post-prison supervision, to participate in a sex offender treatment
program. n154 The petitioner violated that condition, and the Board imposed a local sanction of
ninety days incarceration. n155 The court held that the "Board's authority to require special
conditions [was] restricted to those conditions that are necessary for 'the protection of public safety
and the reformation of the offender.'" n156  [*293]  Because the Board determined, based on the
petitioner's history, that he would both benefit from sex offender treatment and present a danger to
society if released without treatment, the court held that the Board acted within its authority in
imposing the special conditions. n157 Following Rund, it appears that the Board of Parole and Post-
Prison Supervision will also be afforded broad discretion in implementing special conditions as part
of a sex offender's parole or post-prison supervision pursuant to ORS 144.625. It does not appear,
therefore, that an Oregon court will find a double jeopardy violation based on increased parole or
post-prison supervision conditions.
C. Ex Post Facto Laws
 Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution provides that "no ex post facto law ... shall ever be
passed." n158 Ex post facto laws punish acts that were legal before the enactment of those laws,
impose greater or additional punishment than that available before the enactment of those laws, and
deprive the defendant of a defense. n159 ORS 144.625 involves persons convicted of sex offenses
and appears to apply to offenders convicted and sentenced before the bill came into effect in the
summer of 1999. Because ORS 144.625 applies retroactively n160 to convicted sex offenders, a
determination must be made as to whether ORS 144.625 requirements constitute increased
"punishment" for the underlying sex offenses. Resolving this issue requires a two-step inquiry:
 The first question is whether the legislative purpose in enacting  [*294]  the ... [chemical castration
requirement] was punitive. If it was, [chemical castration] constitutes punishment. Determining that
the purpose was not punitive does not end the inquiry, however, but simply leads to the second
question, whether the ... [chemical castration requirement] is so punitive as to negate the
nonpunitive intention. n161
 Assuming that the chemical castration program amounts to punishment, n162 ORS 144.625 may
violate the Oregon Constitution's prohibition of ex post facto laws. The court of appeals noted that
"not every change in law which has a deleterious effect on an individual constitutes an ex post facto
violation." n163 To survive a constitutional ex post facto challenge, mandated chemical castration
must not relate to the length or nature of incarceration or constructive custody. The purpose of the
program must also be protective, not punitive. n164
The Oregon Constitution also prohibits changes in punishment that make the punishment more
burdensome. n165 If the chemical treatment restrictions applied to a parolee on supervised parole
are sufficiently different or more burdensome in comparison to those placed on a parolee without
treatment, mandated castration may constitute an increase in punishment, thus triggering ex post
facto protection. n166 Finally, ex post facto protection distinguishes between an increase in a parole
term and adding a new condition of parole. In Thierman v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison
Supervision, n167 the Oregon Court of Appeals determined that "because parole is a component of
a sentence, no law that increases the term of parole may be applied to a convicted person  [*295]  to
the person's detriment if the law was adopted after the date on which the person committed the
underlying crime." n168 ORS 144.625 purports to add a new condition to the offender's parole or
post-prison supervision: mandatory MPA injections. Violation of the medical program's terms is
considered a violation of a condition of parole or post-prison supervision, which may result in
sanctions. Mandatory use of MPA, when applied to those individuals who committed sex offenses
before the legislation's enacted date, is not an increase in the convicted offender's parole term, but
rather a new condition of his parole or post-prison supervision. n169 Therefore, the added condition
and possible sanctions do not trigger automatic protection against laws that increase the term of
parole if the law was adopted after the date on which the offender committed the crime.
IV
 Chemical Castration as an Alternative to Incarceration: A Civil Liberties Approach
 Although the Oregon branch of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has not published an
opinion to date concerning its position on ORS 144.625, ACLU branches in other states have taken
firm stances on laws mandating chemical castration. The ACLU of Florida, for example, asserts
three positions on the use of MPA as an alternative to incarceration for sex offenses: (1) the use of
drugs on sex offenders is impermissible per se, (2) the use of MPA as a condition of parole is
impermissible because it is involuntary and coerced, and (3) the procedure may be a permissible
alternative to incarceration when administered in conjunction with psychotherapy. n170 Because
these positions address the full scope of potential MPA use, they inform the analysis of ORS
144.625.
 [*296]
A. Impermissible Per Se
 The First Amendment protects individuals' freedom to express and receive ideas and to make
choices in their lives. n171 Relying on First Amendment protections, the position that use of MPA
on sex offenders is impermissible per se derives from the possibility that "the use of behavioral
drugs unduly intrudes on the personality of the individual." n172 Thus, because the forced use of
MPA may violate an individual's right to mental autonomy by suppressing sexual desire based on
thoughts deemed "deviant" by society, mandatory treatment may be unconstitutional. n173
B. Involuntary and Coerced
 This approach rests on the notion that the use of drugs as a condition of parole or post-prison
supervision is impermissible because it is involuntary and coerced. It "rejects the argument that an
individual, with informed consent, can rationally and permissibly choose drugs over incarceration."
n174 In comparison, ORS 144.625 treatment is a mandatory condition of parole for those selected.
The bill provides that failure to cooperate in the treatment program amounts to a violation of the
offender's condition of parole or post-prison supervision. Treatment refusal also subjects the
offender to sanctions. Given that the offender may be subject to longer incarceration periods for
refusing to accept his parole or post-prison supervision condition, or incarceration as a violation of
his parole if the offender refuses treatment after he is released, it is questionable whether the
offender's "consent" to undergo treatment is truly voluntary. Thus, if Oregon civil libertarian groups
take similar positions against the use  [*297]  of mandatory chemical castration as a condition of
parole or post-prison supervision, ORS 144.625 may likely face legal challenges.
C.
"Last Resort" Permissible Alternative to Incarceration
 As an alternative to incarceration and a procedure of "last resort," treatment may be permissible
when administered in conjunction with psychotherapy. The main issue for civil libertarians is
whether the goal of the chemical castration program is to punish the offender or to treat and
rehabilitate the patient. n175 If treatment of the individual is the goal, then few libertarians will
challenge the use of MPA. However, for the drug to be considered rehabilitative treatment, it must
be medically proven to be effective on the sex offender, and its side effects must be safe and
reversible. n176 Additionally, civil libertarians are only willing to accept such treatment provided
that voluntary participation in the treatment program is assured. n177 Another concern involves the
possibility of a systematic bias in favor of MPA use, leading to the drug's overuse and misjudgment
regarding which type of offender benefits from treatment. n178 Civil libertarians warn that under
the wrong conditions, the "therapeutic treatment could victimize rather than benefit patients, much
like a 'Clockwork Orange' scenario." n179
Although Oregon may eventually enact a statute mandating the use of chemical castration as an
alternative to incarceration, ORS 144.625 was not enacted to replace incarceration. ORS 144.625
does not shorten an offender's criminal sentence. Rather, it adds a new condition to the inmate's
parole or post-prison supervision and implies that non-compliance with the treatment procedure - a
violation of parole or post-prison supervision - will result in the offender's re-incarceration. n180
Conclusion
 The sex crime epidemic in the United States and its victim impact have prompted government
officials to find new ways to  [*298]  combat sex crimes. Medical advances have turned the use of
chemical castration into the new rage for sex crime legislation.
Mandatory use of chemical castration on sex offenders as a condition of their parole or post-
prison supervision has not escaped medical or legal criticism, however. Medical experts insist that
MPA is proven effective for only one type of offender: the paraphiliac. Many authorities also argue
that the drug is unlikely to have any meaningful influence on other types of sex offenders,
especially those motivated by anger or hostility. Moreover, mandatory, as opposed to voluntary, use
of MPA has not been proven to be effective. For maximum drug potential and treatment effect,
MPA usage should be limited to the paraphiliac sex offender, should be voluntary as opposed to
forced, and should be combined with psychological or behavioral therapy for maximum treatment
potential.
ORS 144.625 raises multiple constitutional concerns and implicates both federal and state
constitutional prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment, double jeopardy, and ex post facto
laws. First, even assuming that ORS 144.625 constitutes punishment, MPA usage is probably not
cruel and unusual if limited to the appropriate type of offender, and if it is not considered
disproportionate punishment for the offense committed. However, the program's requirement for
mandatory participation and MPA's uncommon, but dangerous, side effects could arguably make
the "treatment" cruel or excessive on offenders whose health may be severely affected by the drug.
With regard to double jeopardy, failure to comply with the program and its resulting sanctions do
not appear to violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the mandated sanctions do not appear to
amount to multiple punishments for the same offense. Rather, it appears to be a consequence of a
parole or post-prison supervision violation. Finally, if the chemical treatment restrictions applied to
a parolee on supervised parole are sufficiently different or more burdensome in comparison to those
placed on parole without treatment, mandatory MPA injections for offenders convicted and
sentenced before the bill's enactment in July 1999 may violate the Oregon Constitution's guarantee
prohibiting ex post facto laws.
In addition to legal challenges, chemical castration use has also drawn criticism from civil
libertarians. The Florida ACLU has asserted three positions on the use of MPA as an alternative to
[*299]  incarceration for sex offenses, all of which are applicable to ORS 144.625. The Florida
ACLU argues that chemical castration is impermissible per se, impermissible if involuntary, and
only appropriate if used as an alternative to incarceration and in conjunction with psychotherapy.
Because of the high-profile nature of sex offenses and pressure on government to find new ways
to combat these crimes, the use of MPA as a part of an offender's reentry into society seems
inevitable. However, given the medical, legal, and moral consequences of such chemical castration
legislation, ORS 144.625 may be challenged as a violation of both federal and state constitutions.
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